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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a derivatives exchange aiming at addressing clients needs
in terms of listed options and providing suitable liquidity. We proceed into two steps. First we
use a quantization method to select the options that should be displayed by the exchange. Then,
using a principal-agent approach, we design a make take fees contract between the exchange and
the market maker. The role of this contract is to provide incentives to the market maker so that
he offers small spreads for the whole range of listed options, hence attracting transactions and
meeting the commercial requirements of the exchange.
Key words: Make take fees, market making, derivatives, market design, quantization, Lloyd’s
algorithm, financial regulation, high frequency trading, principal-agent problem, stochastic control
1 Introduction
Nowadays a typical role of an exchange is to give the possibility to investors to buy or sell financial
products on electronic platforms, in sufficiently large quantity and at a reasonable price. Therefore
exchanges have to set up their markets in a relevant way in order to achieve this goal. The issues
related to market design cover a wide range of topics, from the microstructure of electronic trading
platforms to the basic question of selecting the products that will be traded on the exchange.
Recently many papers have focused on the microstructural aspects of market design. For example the
way of choosing an optimal tick size is addressed in [3], where the authors study the relations between
tick size, volatility and bid-ask bounce frequency. In [2; 6], the relevance of continuous trading and its
comparison with a frequent batch auction system is discussed, while market fragmentation is analyzed
in [8]. Macroscopic features have also been investigated, see for example [7], where different market
structures are classified with respect to several criteria such as matching mechanism, information feed-
back and bid structure.
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Most of the research on market design focuses on stock markets. However, even if exchanges concen-
trate a large part of their activities on simple products such as stocks or futures, many also offer to
their clients the possibility to trade more complex financial instruments such as derivatives. Actually
there is very few academic literature on derivatives market design, mostly addressing the relationship
between stock and option markets. For example in [10] the authors investigate the factors influencing
the selection of stocks for option listing. However, they neither question the optimality of those factors,
nor search for more relevant ones. The papers dealing with market design can in fact be separated
into two groups: the ones that review and try to understand market practice and those proposing
a theoretical framework in order to help exchanges improve their market design. Surprisingly, to our
knowledge, there is no paper of the last kind dealing with derivatives market. In this article we propose
a first contribution in that direction.
We take the realistic point of view of an exchange who wants to organize, or reorganize, its deriva-
tives market. We consider that the market is made of vanilla European options only, that we view as
independent of the underlying. By this, we mean that we deal with options that are used as hedging
instruments and whose prices are essentially fixed by supply and demand. Finally we suppose that the
exchange has access to data allowing for the estimation of the distribution of options market demand.
For example, if the exchange already has a derivatives market it can use its own data, otherwise that
of other exchanges. We focus on two issues: selecting the options that are going to be traded and
attracting liquidity on those options.
The first issue faced by the exchange is the choice of the derivatives offered to the clients. Obviously
it is impossible for the exchange to propose all maturities and strikes on its platform. This would be
very hard to manage from a technical point of view and it would be impossible to guarantee liquidity
on each option. As the maturities are quite standardized, the main challenge relies in strikes selection
satisfying clients needs. Therefore, we consider that the exchange’s problem is to select n call options
(or equivalently n strikes), with fixed maturity, with the aim of maximizing the clients satisfaction.
We define a measurement of this satisfaction and write the exchange objective under the form of a
quantization problems. We refer to [5; 11] for an introduction to quantization. Such approach allows
the exchange to select automatically a set of options based only on the data at its disposal.
The next goal of the exchange is to attract liquidity on its platform in order to increase the amount of
executed orders. To do so, one way is to use a make take fees system: the exchange typically associates
a fee rebate to executed limit orders, while charging a transaction fee for market orders. This enables
it to subsidise liquidity provision and tax liquidity consumption. In [4] the authors design the optimal
make take fees policy for a market with one market maker and a single undeying asset. This work has
been extended in [1] to the case of multiple market makers. The general principle of the approach in
[1; 4] is to consider that the exchange offers a contract to the market maker whose pay-off depends on
the market order flow he generates. The problem of the exchange then boils down into designing the
optimal contract in order to optimize the number of transactions.
However, in our setting the problem faced by the exchange is more complex to several extents. The
main difference with the framework of [1; 4] is that the exchange has to manage several assets simulta-
neously, namely the different options quoted on the platform. In order to focus on this issue we assume
that there is only one market maker setting bid and ask quotes for all available options. Another chal-
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lenge for a derivatives exchange is the possible absence of quotations for far from the money options
(or quotations with a too wide spread). Such issue arises essentially for commercial reasons. Indeed, an
exchange does not wish to display to its clients a product with scarse liquidity. It wants to make sure
that there is sufficient available volume on the market for the whole range of listed options. Therefore,
the design of an optimal make take fees policy for options market must aim at providing incentives to
the market maker to lower the spreads, notably for far from the money options.
To do so, we are inspired by [1; 4], using a principal-agent framework. The exchange (the principal)
has to design a contract towards the market maker (the agent) that maximizes a certain utility that
depends on the behavior of the market maker. The main point is that the market maker’s behavior,
here the quoted spread on every available option, cannot be dictated by the exchange and depends on
the contract. For example if the contract offers high incentives for every executed ask market order,
then it is likely that the ask price quoted by the market maker will be close to the mid price. Formally,
for a given contract, the market maker determines its behavior by solving a stochastic control problem.
Then in order to find the optimal contract, the exchange maximizes its expected utility over the set of
admissible contracts, knowing the market maker’s response to each contract.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain how an exchange can select the options
that will be traded on its platform using only market data. Then in Section 3 we design the optimal
contract that the exchange should offer to the market maker in order to maximize liquidity. Proofs
and technical results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Market driven selection of the listed options
In this section we build a method for the exchange to select the strikes that are going to be traded on
its platform. This approach uses only data from trades volume reports and is based on a quantization
algorithm. We illustrate this method by numerical experiments using data provided by Euronext.
2.1 How to choose the strikes in order to match market demand?
We consider European call options with strikes expressed in percentage of the spot price (in moneyness)
and that the exchange wishes to select n strikes.1 Choosing relevant strikes, the exchange’s objective
is to maximize the satisfaction of the investors. So, we focus in this section on the market taking side
of the trading flow. Section 3 will be rather devoted to market makers.
We measure the regret of a market taker associated to the execution of a market order as a function
of the difference between the strike he would have ideally bought (or sold) and the strike he actually
bought (or sold). More precisely, for a given maturity, consider strikes K1 < · · · < Kn that represent
the options listed by the exchange. When a market taker wants to buy an option with strike K he
sends a market order on the option whose strike is the nearest from K. Hence he buys (or sells) the
option with strike Ki where i is such that
Ki = arg min
1≤j≤n
|K −Kj|.
1We do not address here the problem of choosing the number of strikes to propose. This point is left for further
research.
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We consider that the regret associated to this market order is ρ(|K − Ki|) where ρ is an increasing
function. Note that the regret of the market order can be written
min
1≤j≤n
ρ(|K −Kj|).
We finally assume that the strike K is randomly chosen according to the distribution Pmkt. This
probability measure represents the law of market demand. Thus the higher the demand for a given
strike the higher the probability that K is close to this strike. The exchange can easily estimate the
distribution Pmkt using data from its own options market or from other exchanges. The average regret
of a market order is therefore written
Emkt[ min
1≤j≤n
ρ(|K −Kj|)], (2.1)
where Emkt denotes the expectation when K ∼ Pmkt. The problem of the exchange is then to find
the n-uplet (Ki)1≤i≤n that minimizes (2.1). Formally this corresponds to the following minimization
problem:
arg min
K1≤···≤Kn
Emkt[ min
1≤j≤n
ρ(|K −Kj|)]. (2.2)
This type of optimization is classical in the field of signal or image processing and is called quantization
problem. The main idea of quantization is to summarize the information contained in a complex prob-
ability measure into a uniform probability with finite support. As an example, it allows to compress a
signal (or an image) by selecting among its spectrum a given number of frequencies that summarizes
the signal with the smallest possible loss of information. For an introduction to quantization problem
see [5; 11].
In this article we consider the quantization problem (2.2) when ρ is a power-law function of the form
ρ(x) = |x|p with p ≥ 2. The power-law function has the advantage to be symmetric and convex.
Therefore greater errors are increasingly penalized. As a consequence we expect the solution of (2.2)
to capture the features of the tails of Pmkt. Moreover the greater p, the more large errors are penalized.
Hence for a large p, the (Ki)1≤i≤n solution of (2.2) are likely to be more spread towards large strikes
and contain more extreme values of the distribution Pmkt.
2.2 Solving the quantization problem
In this section we give some sufficient conditions that ensure that (2.2) has a unique solution. We also
explain how (2.2) can be solved.
To get existence of a solution to the problem (2.2) we need to make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The probability Pmkt is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure
with density that is log-concave and compactly supported in [0, K], K > 0.
The assumption on the support of the probability is very reasonable since strikes between 0 and 200%
of the spot price basically cover all the possible strikes of traded options. The log-concavity assumption
is not really restrictive since it allows us to consider a wide class of probability distributions such as
exponential type and Gaussian laws. It is shown in [5, Theorem I-5.1] that under Assumption 2.1,
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Problem (2.2) admits a unique non degenerate solution. The term non degenerate simply means that
the optimal set of strikes satisfies K1 < · · · < Kn.
We now present a way to approximate numerically the solution of (2.2). The idea behind the algo-
rithm is that the solution (Ki)1≤i≤n can be seen as the fixed point of a function. This provides us
a numerical method to approximate the (Ki)1≤i≤n that consists in iterating this function. This is
known as the Lloyd’s algorithm, which is a very intuitive approach that searches step by step the so-
lution of (2.2). A very convenient aspect of this algorithm is that it is automatic and easy to implement.
The Lloyd’s algorithm starts with an initial set of strikes (Ki)1≤i≤n and is made of three steps:
1. For any i, identify Ai the set of "wished" strikes that corresponds to market orders sent to the
strike Ki. Equivalently Ai contains all the strikes K which are closer to Ki than from any other
Kj
Ai = {K, s.t i = arg min
1≤j≤n
|K −Kj|}.
2. Set K ′i as the unique strike in Ai that minimizes the average regret of market orders sent with
ideal strike in Ai. More precisely K ′i is given by
K ′i = arg min
k∈Ai
Emkt[|K − k|p1K∈Ai ].
3. Go back to Step 1 with (Ki)1≤i≤n = (K ′i)1≤i≤n (or stop if a certain stopping criterion is reached
and consider (K ′i)1≤i≤n as the approximate solution of (2.2)).
The Lloyd’s algorithm has a very clear interpretation in terms of selecting the optimal set of strikes:
first it identifies the area "controlled" by the i− th strike and then improves the choice of the strikes. It
is then intuitive that the solution of (2.2) is a fixed point of the Lloyd’s algorithm. The sets (Ai)1≤i≤n
form a covering of R+ that is often called the Voronoï tesselation associated to the (Ki)1≤i≤n. It is easy
to show that, for Step 1
A1 = [0, K1], An = [Kn, K] and for i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} : Ai = [Ki +Ki−12 ,
Ki+1 +Ki
2 ].
A usual stopping criterion for Step 3 is when (K ′i)1≤i≤n is too close from (Ki)1≤i≤n. More precisely the
algorithm stops if
n∑
i=1
|K ′i −Ki| < ε,
for a certain ε > 0. Note that, starting from a discrete valued Pmkt (as will be the case here), when p = 2,
Step 2 of the Lloyd’s algorithm boils down to compute the average realization of Pmkt conditional on
being in Ai. This can be obtained instantaneously. However when p > 2, Step 2 is not straightforward
to compute in general. Yet the objective function being convex and taking the derivative with respect
to k, a necessary and sufficient condition for k to be solution of Step 2 is
E[|K − k|p−2(K − k)1K∈Ai ] = 0
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or equivalently
k = E
mkt[K|K − k|p−21K∈Ai ]
Emkt[|K − k|p−21K∈Ai ]
.
This characterizes the solution of Step 2 as a fixed point. Thus one usually replaces Step 2 by its
iterative version:
K ′i =
Emkt[K|K −Ki|p−21K∈Ai ]
Emkt[|K −Ki|p−21K∈Ai ]
.
From now on, we call Lloyd’s algorithm the initial algorithm where we replace Step 2 by its approxi-
mate version. We prove in Appendix 2.1 that (Ki)1≤i≤n is solution of (2.2) if and only if it is a fixed
point of the Lloyd’s algorithm. The great strength of this method is that it is easy to implement,
transparent, and completely automatic. Note also that if Pmkt has a discrete support, say 10 strikes,
then the Lloyd’s algorithm will not necessarily select those strikes as solution of (2.2).
We now turn to numerical experiments illustrating the efficiency of our method.
2.3 Application
In this section we apply our methodology to market data. First we describe the data and then present
our numerical results.
2.3.1 Description of the data
We use data from Euronext, one of the main stock and option exchanges in Europe. The dataset
contains for every trading day from the 3-rd of December 2018 to the 24-th of May 2019 and for every
available options the total number of trades (buy and sell) during the day. Our dataset is only made
of transactions that occurred on the Euronext platform. In particular we neither use OTC data nor
data from another exchange. We choose for our example the most standard call options in terms of
underlying on Euronext, namely options on the CAC 40 index. We report in Table 1 the number of call
options traded each month for different ranges of maturity and in Table 2 the number of call options
traded each month for each strike.
In Figure 1, we display the empirical distribution of traded option strikes (for all maturities) and the
quantile plot of the maturity distribution in log-scale. The distribution of the strikes is unimodal,
concentrated near the money and skewed towards in the money strikes. In Figure 2, we provide
the empirical distribution of traded options strikes for different ranges of maturity. We see that the
distribution of the strikes depends on the maturity. In particular, the variance of the distribution is
increasing with the maturity. The skewness towards in the money strikes is present for any maturity.
2.3.2 Numerical results
We now present our numerical results. Since the distribution of the strikes depends on the maturity
and because short maturities are over-represented in our data, we split our dataset into four subsets
depending on the maturity:
• maturity less than 1 month,
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Figure 1: Empirical distribution of traded option strikes (left). Quantile plot in log-scale of traded
option maturities for the whole sample set (right).
Figure 2: Empirical distribution of the strikes for different maturities.
Maturity December January February March April May
T≤ 1M 135951 99202 96323 191357 161937 108491
1M<T≤ 3M 79016 61651 30371 117400 58914 121267
3M<T≤ 6M 10990 13279 15979 33901 11227 11779
6M < T 71977 30278 14197 17158 25354 21330
Table 1: Number of options traded by maturity and month.
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Strike (%) December January February March April May
20 0 0 0 0 55 10
30 1 1692 2 381 0 0
40 0 77 0 80 3 41
50 58 417 0 328 2031 1948
60 1933 152 31 323 691 2092
70 1402 1928 653 3837 2412 2956
80 12814 12952 3400 10118 14689 12147
90 113210 114463 10465 247877 184835 147362
100 159075 68747 130002 94714 50621 90528
110 5811 3586 12253 1766 83 2205
120 869 94 64 11 0 16
130 1 11 0 0 0 0
140 0 0 0 0 2012 1960
150 0 0 0 381 0 1602
160 1720 271 0 0 0 0
170 1040 20 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Number of options traded by strike and month.
• maturity between 1 and 3 months,
• maturity between 3 and 6 months,
• maturity larger than 6 months.
For any of those subsets we approximate the solution of the quantization problem (2.2) using the
Lloyd’s algorithm for n = 10 and with stopping parameter ε = 10−8. As initial value, we use n points
(Ki)1≤i≤n generated with uniform law between the 10-th and 90-th percentile of the dataset. In Fig-
ures 3 and 4 we plot a visualization of the quantization of the different sets obtained for p = 2 and p = 8.
The strikes selected by the Lloyd’s algorithm manage to reproduce some of the statistical properties of
the demand distribution Pmkt. In particular, for any range of maturity, the distribution of the (Ki)1≤i≤n
is skewed towards in the money strikes. Also the variance of the selected strikes is increasing with the
maturity as for market data.
We observe that for p = 8 the strikes selected by the quantization method are more spread towards large
strikes than for p = 2. This is not surprising since the penalization of large errors is increasing with p for
the regret function | · |p. Therefore, as expected, the larger p, the more the solution of the quantization
problem (2.2) contains extreme values of the distribution Pmkt. We also note that the selected strikes
for p = 8 exhibit some kind of redundancy: some of them are very close to each other. In practice, one
would of course discard one of two strikes being very close (it may then be interesting to take a smaller
n). For practical applications, the easiest approach is probably to use p = 2. With this choice, the
Lloyd’s algorithm is very fast and easy to implement. It also corresponds to the most documented case.
Finally we insist on the fact that when an exchange uses our methodology for strikes selection, it is
interesting, if possible, to include transactions from other exchanges and from the OTC market in
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Figure 3: Quantization of the option strikes using p = 2 and ε = 10−8. Empirical distribution of traded
strikes is plotted in blue or red. The dotted lines correspond to the optimal quantization of Pmkt.
Figure 4: Quantization of the option strikes using p = 8 and ε = 10−8. Empirical distribution of traded
strikes is plotted in blue or red. The dotted lines correspond to the optimal quantization of Pmkt.
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the dataset. This is because using only its own trade data may induce a bias in the strikes selection.
For example if for some reasons clients of an exchange go on other venues to buy (or sell) out of the
money options, then, in the exchange dataset, there will be very few transactions reported on out of
the money options. This will lead to inaccuracies since the demand for out of the money options will
be underestimated.
We now turn to the problem of providing incentives to the market maker to quote attractive spreads
in order to attract liquidity towards the selected options.
3 Incentive policy of the exchange
In this section, we assume that the exchange has already selected a list of options. The goal is to
design a contract between the exchange and the market maker so that the latter receives incentives
to provide suitable liquidity on all the options. We first describe the market and assumptions. In
particular, due to the short time horizon we are working on, we can assume a Bachelier model for the
underlying asset and constant delta for the options. Then, we introduce a class of tractable admissible
contracts proposed to the market maker. These contracts are indexed on the transactions induced by
the behavior of the market maker. We show that there is no loss of generality in considering such
class of contracts. For a given contract, the market maker solves an optimization problem to deduce
its optimal quotes for each option. Then, the exchange maximizes his expected utility over the set of
admissible contracts, knowing the response of the market maker to a given contract.
The utility of the exchange is made of two parts: one component related to the actual Profit and Loss
(PnL for short) due to transactions, and one aiming at ensuring that enough liquidity is constantly
posted on every option. As explained in the introduction, this second component addresses commercial
constraints in order to make the exchange competitive. In particular, our model is flexible and can
be designed so that the exchange has more interest in reducing the spreads for far from the money
options, although not very traded, than for near the money options. We derive explicitly the optimal
incentives that should be offered, up to the resolution of a two-dimensional linear PDE.
We conclude this section with numerical results showing the impact of the incentive policy on the
spread of the listed options.
3.1 The market
This section is devoted to the description of the market model.
We consider a finite trading horizon time T > 0 and a probability space (Ω,F ,P0) under which all
stochastic processes are defined. Following Section 2, we work on a market where European call options
with strike k ∈ K := {K1, . . . , Kn} and maturity τ ∈ T := {T1, . . . , Tm} can be traded. We focus on
call options but our results can be extended to put options in a straightforward manner. The price of
the underlying, observable by all market participants, has a dynamic given by
dSt = σdWt, (3.1)
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where σ > 0 is the volatility of the asset and W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. The choice of
an arithmetic Brownian motion is motivated by the fact that we use a reasonably short time horizon
T (less than one day). On such scale, Bachelier and Black-Scholes type dynamics are quite indistin-
guishable.
Assuming zero interest rate, we write the price at time t of the call option with maturity τ and strike
k as Ck,τt . Its dynamic is given by
dCk,τt = σ∆k,τt dWt, (3.2)
where ∆k,τt := N (dt) is the Bachelier delta of the call option Ck,τ at time t, N (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard Gaussian law and dt := St−kσ√τ .
As we work over a short time horizon, the delta of the quoted options does not vary significantly.
Hence, throughout the paper, we assume it to be constant.
Assumption 3.1. We consider that
∆k,τt = ∆k,τ .
The delta of each option therefore becomes a model parameter. If the exchange observes a significant
underlying price move, he can recalibrate the deltas, which will lead to a different pay-off of the contract
for the market maker.
The market maker displays bid and ask quotes on the listed options. The market maker best bid price
and best ask price at time t on the option with maturity τ and strike k are
P k,τ,bt := Ck,τt − δk,τ,bt , P k,τ,at = Ck,τt + δk,τ,at , t ∈ [0, T ],
where the superscript b (resp. a) stands for bid (resp. ask). So we consider that the market maker
controls the spreads δk,τ := (δk,τ,a, δk,τ,b) on each option. The set of admissible controls for the market
maker is therefore defined as
A :=
{
(δt)t∈[0,T ] = (δk,τ,it )t∈[0,T ], k ∈ K, τ ∈ T , i ∈ {a, b}, predictable and s.t |δk,τ,it | ≤ δ∞
}
, (3.3)
where δ∞ > 0 is a constant, assumed to be large enough to satisfy technical conditions (see Appendix
A.8). In practice it is of course not restrictive to assume that the spreads are bounded.
We now describe the dynamics of the market order flow. For every listed option, the arrival of ask
(resp. bid) market orders is modeled by a point process Nk,τ,a (resp. Nk,τ,b). We expect the intensity
of buy (resp. sell) market order arrivals to be a decreasing function of both the spread quoted by the
market maker δk,τ and the transaction cost fk,τ collected by the exchange. This has quite natural
interpretation as a wider spread or higher fee decreases the number of transactions on the considered
option. Moreover, we know from the literature (see [3], [9] and [13]) that the average number of trades
per unit of time for single assets is a decreasing function of the ratio between spread and volatility.
Assuming same kind of behavior for the options, this leads to the following form of the intensity
function:
λk,τ (δk,τ,it ) := A exp
(
− C
σ
(δk,τ,it + fk,τ )
)
,
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where A and C are positive constants that can be calibrated using market data, and fk,τ represents
the fee fixed by the exchange for each market order. Furthermore, we assume that all market orders
are of unit size.
The main difficulty in our framework is that the market maker is dealing with multiple derivatives. If
the market maker strategy depends on its inventory on each option, then the problem lies in dimension
n, which becomes intricate for large n. However, we will see that we can circumvent this issue since
in our case we can aggregate the risk factors related to the inventories through the delta weighted
cumulated inventory:
Qt :=
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τQk,τt , (3.4)
where Qk,τt := Nk,τ,bt − Nk,τ,at is the number of options Ck,τ held by the market maker at time t.
Each inventory is weighted by the corresponding ∆ (see Section 3.2 for details). Thus, the quantity
Q represents the marked-to-market value of the market maker’s portfolio. It therefore contains the
market risk carried by the market maker. For example an out of the money option will account for
a small part of the total risk, and conversely for in the money options. Finally we consider that the
market maker has a critical absolute inventory q ∈ N. The intensity of the orders arrival is then
λk,τ,i := λk,τ (δk,τ,it )1{φ(i)Qt−>−q} with φ(i) :=
{
1 if i = a
−1 if i = b.
Remark 3.2. Note that there is a direct link between the spread quoted by the market maker and his
inventory process. Indeed a lower spread δk,τ,b (resp. δk,τ,a) on the bid (resp. ask) side of the listed
option Ck,τ increases the intensity of orders arrival λk,τ,b (resp. λk,τ,a). This leads to an increase (resp.
decrease) of the inventory process Qk,τ . In other words, the market maker skews his quotes depending
on the level of its aggregated inventory.
3.2 Market maker’s problem and contract representation
In this section we exhibit the class of contracts used by the exchange. We also explain and solve the
market maker’s problem for any admissible contract.
The PnL of the market maker is defined as the sum of the cash earned from his executed orders and
of the value of his inventory on each traded option. Thus, using that ∑(k,τ)∈K×T Qk,τt ∆k,τSt = QtSt, it
writes
PLδt :=Wδt +QtSt, (3.5)
where
Wδt :=
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
P k,τ,au dNk,τ,au −
∫ t
0
P k,τ,bu dNk,τ,bu
stands for his cash process at time t ∈ [0, T ]. This expression shows the relevance of the variable
Q for the market maker. It represents the volatility of the market maker’s PnL with respect to the
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underlying price movements. Using (3.2), a direct integration by parts leads to the following form of
the PnL process:
PLδt :=
∑
i∈{a,b}
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
δk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +QudSu.
Moreover, the exchange offers to the market maker a contract ξ, namely an FT -measurable random
variable, which is added to his PnL at the end of the trading period. This contract aims at incentivizing
the market maker to reduce the spread quoted for each option. More details will be given in Section
3.3. The contract depends on all the transactions occuring between time 0 and time T , as well as on
the efficient price moves.
Thus taking an exponential utility function, the market maker maximizes the following functional of
his wealth:
VMM(ξ) := sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
− exp
(
− γ
(
ξ + PLδT
))]
, (3.6)
where γ > 0 denotes the market maker’s risk aversion parameter and Eδ the probability measure as-
sociated to a given control process δ ∈ A, see Appendix A.2.2 for details. For the well-posedness of
Equation (3.6), we need integrability conditions on the contract ξ, see Appendix A.3 for details.
Finally we consider that the market maker accepts a contract ξ only if its associated optimal expected
utility VMM(ξ) is above some fixed threshold R < 0. This threshold, called reservation utility of the
agent, is the critical utility value under which the market maker has no interest in the contract. This
quantity has to be taken into account carefully by the exchange before proposing a contract to the
market makers.
We now introduce the class of contracts proposed to the market maker. Given Y0 > 0, and predictable
processes Z := (ZCk,τ , Zk,τ,i)k∈K τ∈T i∈{a,b} ∈ Z (see Appendix A.3 for a definition of Z), we introduce
a special class of remuneration ξ = Y Y0,ZT of the form
Y Y0,ZT :=Y0+
∫ T
0
(∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Zk,τ,ir dNk,τ,ir +ZC
k,τ
r dCk,τr
)
+
(1
2γσ
2
(∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τ (ZCk,τr +Qk,τr )
)2
−H(Zr, Qr)
)
dr,
(3.7)
where for (z, q) ∈ R2×#K×#T × R with z := (zk,τ )(k,τ)∈K×T , the function H, called Hamiltonian of the
market maker, is defined by2
H(z, q) := sup
δ∈R2×#K×#T
h(δ, z, q)
with
h(δ, z, q) :=
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
γ−1
(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
zk,τ,i + δk,τ,i
)))
λk,τ (δk,τ,i)1{φ(i)Q>−q}.
2This Hamiltonian term appears naturally when applying the dynamic programming principle for the market maker’s
problem.
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Actually, it turns out that it is enough to consider contracts of the form (3.7). More precisely, we show
that any admissible contract (in the sense of the integrability conditions specified in Appendix A.1), is
of this form. We have the following lemma proved in Appendix A.5.
Lemma 3.3. Any contract ξ satisfying (A.1) has a unique representation ξ = Y Y0,ZT for some
(
Y0, Z
)
∈
R×Z.
Furthermore, the terms defining (3.7) have natural interpretation.
• The compensation Y0 is calibrated by the exchange to ensure the reservation utility constraint
with level R of the market maker.3
• The term ZCk,τ is the compensation given to the market maker with respect to the volatility risk
induced by the option Ck,τ .
• Each time a trade is executed on the ask (resp. bid) side for the option Ck,τ , the market maker
is compensated by the term Zk,τ,a (resp. Zk,τ,b).
• The term 12γσ2
( K∑
k=1
T∑
τ=1
∆(ZCk,τ +Qk,τ )
)2
−H(Z,Q) is a continuous coupon given to the market
maker.
When the market maker remuneration is Y Y0,Z , its optimal response can be computed explicitly as a
functional of Z.
Theorem 3.4. For ξ = Y Y0,Z, the market maker utility is
VMM(Y Y0,ZT ) = − exp(−γY0),
associated to the optimal bid-ask policy δˆk,τ,it (ξ) := ∆i(Zk,τ,it ), where
∆i(Zk,τ,it ) := (−δ∞) ∨
(
− Zk,τ,it +
1
γ
log
(
1 + σγ
C
))
∧ δ∞ for (k, τ, i) ∈ K × T × {a, b}. (3.8)
Theorem 3.4 provides the optimal response of the market maker to any contract of the form (3.7), see
Appendix A.7 for the proof. Moreover from Equation (3.8), we get that the exchange can anticipate
the optimal behavior of the market maker. It is therefore easy for the platform to compute its own
utility for a given contract.
3.3 Solving the exchange’s problem
In this section we formalize the goal of the exchange and solve the problem of designing the optimal
contract.
3From Theorem 3.4, we see that taking Y0 = − log(−R) ensures the reservation utility of the market maker.
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3.3.1 Description of the exchange’s problem
We recall that the exchange has two objectives. The first one is to receive a high number of trades to
collect the associated fees. The second is to have small spreads on its platform, in particular for far
from the money options for which spreads are typically large. This is because the clients want to have
sufficient liquidity on the whole list of options.
In order to quantify the first objective, we introduce a weighted version of the total number of trades:
Nt =
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
ck,τNk,τ,it ,
where for any (k, τ) ∈ K×T , ck,τ ≥ 0 represents the value attributed to a trade on the option Ck,τ by
the exchange.4 Hence the more the exchange wants to attract liquidity on the option Ck,τ , the higher
ck,τ has to be. If the considered option is very liquid (at the money options for example), the exchange
may choose a rather small ck,τ .
To take into account the second objective, we consider the following quantity
LδT :=
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ T
0
ω
(
δk,τ,it − δk,τ∞
)
dNk,τ,it , (3.9)
where ω ∈ [0, 1),5 and δk,τ∞ can be seen as a spread threshold the exchange would like to impose to the
market maker. The more important the second objective for the exchange, the closer to one ω has to
be chosen.
We thus consider that the exchange is looking for the contract ξ that maximizes the following quantity:
Eδˆ(ξ)
− exp(− η(NT − Lδ(ξ)T − ξ)
), (3.10)
where η > 0 is the risk aversion of the exchange and δˆ(ξ) denotes the optimal response of the market
maker given the contract ξ.
According to Lemma 3.3, we know that it is enough for the exchange to consider contracts of the form
Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R×Z. So, (3.10) becomes
Eδˆ(Y Y0,Z)
− exp(− η(NT − Lδ(Y Y0,Z)T − Y Y0,ZT )
). (3.11)
Moreover for a contract of the form Y Y0,Z , from Theorem 3.4, the exchange knows the best response
δˆ(Y Y0,Z) of the market maker. Indeed we recall that the optimal controls are given by
δˆk,τ,i(Y Y0,Z) = ∆i(Zk,τ,it ).
4One can for example take ck,τ = fk,τ . In this case, NT represents the total amount of fees collected by the exchange.
5The choice of ω ∈ [0, 1) is for technical reasons only.
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It implies that
Lδˆ(Y Y0,Z)T = LZT :=
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ T
0
ω
(
∆i(Zk,τ,it )− δk,τ∞
)
dNk,τ,it .
As in [4], we notice that for a given contract Y Y0,Z , the market maker’s optimal response does not
depend on Y0. The exchange objective function (3.11) being decreasing in Y0, the maximization with
respect to Y0 is achieved at the level Yˆ0 = − log(−R).6 Finally, the exchange problem becomes
V E0 := sup
Z∈Z
E∆(Z)
− exp(− η(N ZT − LZT − Y Yˆ0,ZT )
). (3.12)
3.3.2 Stochastic control approach for the reduced exchange problem
In this section we solve the reduced exchange problem (3.12). We characterize the optimal contract
components Z? and explain how to compute them in practice.
To solve this stochastic control problem, we study the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for
short) equation. This approach characterizes an optimal Z? solving (3.12) under the form of a feedback
function. The following result is proved in Appendix A.8.
Theorem 3.5. The maximization problem (3.12) admits a solution Z? given by
Z?k,τ,i(t,Qt−) := 1
a− b log
(
bx2U
(
t,Qt−
)
axk,τ1 U
(
t,Qt− −∆k,τφ(i)
)) and Z?Ck,τ (t, Qk,τt ) := − γγ + ηQk,τt , (3.13)
for (k, τ, i) ∈ K × T × {a, b}, where a, b, (xk,τ1 )k∈K,τ∈T and x2 are constants defined in Appendix A.8
and where U˜ := (−U)− Cση(1−ω) is the unique solution of the following linear PDE on [0, T ]× R: 0 = ∂tU˜(t,Q)− U˜(t,Q)
Cγη
γ+η
σ
2(1−ω)Q2 +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Cˆk,τ U˜
(
t,Q−∆k,τφ(i)
)
1φ(i)Q>−q,
U˜(T,Q) = 1,
(3.14)
where Cˆk,τ are defined in Apppendix A.8.
Theorem 3.5 provides the incentives Z? that maximize the exchange expected utility function, see
Appendix A.8 for the proof. The optimal contract is therefore given by
ξ? = Y Yˆ0,Z∗ = Yˆ0 +
∫ T
0
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
(∑
i=a,b
Z?k,τ,ir dNk,τ,ir + Z?C
k,τ
r dCk,τr
)
(3.15)
+
∫ T
0
(1
2γσ
2
( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τ (Z?Ck,τr +Qk,τr )
)2
−H(Z?r , Qr)
)
dr.
We now provide some comments on the interpretation of the optimal incentives.
6Note that − exp(−Yˆ0) = R.
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• The term ∫ T0 Z?Ck,τu dCk,τu in the optimal contract corresponds to part of the inventory risk process
of the market maker (Qk,τt Ck,τt )t∈[0,T ] that is supported by the exchange. As in [4], the proportion
of risk handled by the platform on each option is γ
γ+η . Hence, the more risk averse the exchange,
the smallest this proportion.
• An application of Ito’s formula gives the following approximation:
log
(
U˜(t,Q)
U˜
(
t,Q−∆k,τφ(i)
)) ≈ φ(i)2 σ
C
(T − t)C˜∆k,τQ, (3.16)
where C˜ := Cγη
γ+η
σ
2(1−ω) . Thus, when the aggregated inventory is highly positive, the exchange
provides incentives to the market maker so that it attracts buy market orders and tries to dissuade
him to accept more sell market orders, and conversely for a negative inventory.
• Numerically, we show that the incentive Z?k,τ,a and Z?k,τ,b given by (3.13) are increasing functions
of the value ck,τ that the principal associates to the option Ck,τ . Hence, he logically provides
higher incentives to an option he is more interested in.
• Although the principal manages a large number of listed options, we circumvent the curse of
dimensionality by working with the aggregated inventory process. Note that the pay-off of the
optimal contract depends only on t and Q. Thus it is very easy to compute for the exchange at
the end of the trading day.
In practice to implement the above methodology, one needs to compute the function U˜ in order to
design the optimal contract. A first way to do this is to use a classical finite difference scheme on the
PDE (3.14). In Section 3.4 we use this technique for some numerical experiments on our method.
Moreover, as PDE (3.14) is linear, we can also resort to a probabilistic representation to compute U˜
using a Monte-Carlo method. More precisely we have the following result which is a direct consequence
of the Feynman-Kac formula.
Lemma 3.6. We have the following representation:
U˜(t, q) := E
[
exp
( ∫ T
t
−C˜
(
Qt,qs
)2
+
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
λ
k,τ,i
s ds
)]
, (3.17)
where
Qt,qs = q +
∫ s
t
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τd
(
N
k,τ,b
u −Nk,τ,au
)
,
where for any (k, τ) ∈ K × T and i = a or b, Nk,τ,i is a point process with intensity λk,τ,is :=
Cˆk,τ1{φ(i)Qt,q
s−>−q}
, with Cˆk,τ defined in Appendix A.8.
The proof is in the same vein as [4, Proposition 4.1]. We now turn to numerical illustrations of our
make take fees policy.
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3.4 Numerical results
For numerical experiments, we consider three options which are characterized by their delta. We fix
the following parameters: A = 1.5s−1, σ = C = 0.3s−1/2, fk,τ = [0.5, 0.8, 0.8] the vector of fees, and
δk,τ∞ = [2, 3, 3] the set of quotation thresholds. The first option is at the money, the second one is in
the money and the third is out of the money, hence the following set of deltas [0.5, 0.8, 0.2]. Moreover,
we take η = 1, γ = 0.01, T = 100s, q = 40.
We analyze the impact of the penalty ω and the weight associated to each options ck,τ in the value
function of the exchange.
In Figure 5, we display the average bid-ask spread at initial time on each option for ω = 0, and ck,τ
being equal either to 0 or 0.1. We see that a higher ck,τ leads to a decrease of the spread for the
option Ck,τ . This result is in line with the form of the incentives in Theorem 3.5. Indeed Z?k,τ,i is an
increasing function of ck,τ and δˆk,τ,i is a decreasing function of Z?k,τ,i. Thus, increasing the interest of
the principal for the option Ck,τ leads to a decrease of the spread proposed by the market maker on
this option. This shows that the exchange has a direct control on each option he is interested in.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the spread at initial time with respect to inventory, ω = 0.
In Figure 6, we focus on the role of ω, equal to 0.1 on the spreads proposed by the market maker. As
expected, a non-vanishing value of ω leads to a decrease of the spread for all the quoted options. This
agrees with Theorem 3.5, where we see that the incentives are an increasing function of ω ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, the exchange can influence the whole set of spreads proposed on the quoted options.
We conclude by showing in Figure 7 the behavior of the average spread with a higher ω, equal to 0.2.
We obtain similar effects as in Figure 6, namely a decrease of the spread on all quoted options for a
higher ω.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the spread at initial time with respect to inventory, ω = 0.1.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the spread at initial time with respect to inventory, ω = 0.2.
3.5 Conclusion
This work is, to our knowledge, the first to address the problem of designing a derivatives exchange,
based solely on market data. In the first part, a simple market driven methodology enables us to choose
which options the exchange should select to attract market takers. In the second part, we provide a
make take fees policy between the exchange and the market maker which ensures a high quality of
liquidity for the listed options.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of the convergence of the Lloyd’s algorithm
According to Paragraph 5.2 in [5], the set (Ki)1≤i≤n is a solution of (2.2) if and only if for any i, Ai
has positive Lebesgue measure and∫
Ai
|Ki − x|p−1sgin(x−Ki)Pmkt(dx) = 0,
where sgin is the sign function. This is equivalent to
Ki =
∫
Ai
|Ki − x|p−2xPmkt(dx)∫
Ai
|Ki − x|p−2Pmkt(dx) =
Emkt[|Ki −K|p−2K1K∈Ai ]
Emkt[|Ki −K|p−21K∈Ai ]
.
Thus (Ki)1≤i≤N is the solution of (2.2) if and only if it is a fixed point of the Lloyd’s algorithm.
We now give proofs and technical results for Section 3. They are mostly inspired by [4]. However, for
sake of completeness, we provide rigorous derivations.
A.2 Stochastic basis
A.2.1 Canonical process
In this section, we give an accurate definition of the probability space defined in Section 3.1. We
consider a final horizon time T > 0 and the space Ω =: Ωc ×Ω2×#T ×#Kd , with Ωc the set of continuous
functions from [0, T ] into R and Ωd the set of piecewise constant càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into N. We
consider Ω as a subspace of the Skorokhod space D([0, T ],R2×#T ×#K+1) of càdlàg functions from [0, T ]
into R2×#T ×#K+1 and F the trace Borel σ−algebra on Ω, where the topology is the one associated to
the usual Skorokhod distance on D([0, T ],R2×#T ×#K+1).
We define (Xt)t∈[0,T ] :=
(
Wt, (Nk,τ,it )i=a,b;k∈K;τ∈T
)
as the canonical process on Ω, that is for any ω =
(w, nk,τ,i) ∈ Ω
Wt(ω) = w(t), Nk,τ,it (ω) = nk,τ,i(t).
A.2.2 Probability measure
We now properly define P0 and the associated change of measure. We set the probability P0 on (Ω,F)
such that under P0, W , Nk,τ,i are independent, W is a one–dimensional Brownian motion and the
Nk,τ,i, k ∈ K, τ ∈ T , i = a, b are Poisson processes with intensity λk,τ,i(0).7 Finally, we endow the space
(Ω,F) with the (P0−completed) canonical filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by (Xt)t∈[0,T ].
By (3.3), the control process must be predictable and uniformly bounded. The last assumption is
required to define the associated probability measure. So for δ ∈ A we introduce the corresponding
7In other words, P0 is simply the product measure of the Wiener measure on Ωc and the unique measure on Ω2×#T ×#Kd
that makes the canonical process an homogeneous Poisson process with the prescribed intensity.
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probability measure Pδ under which St = S0 + σWt follows (3.1) and for k ∈ K, τ ∈ T , i ∈ {a, b} the
N δ,k,τ,it := Nk,τ,it −
∫ t
0
λk,τ (δk,τ,ir )1{φ(i)Qr−>−q}dr
are martingales. This probability measure is defined by the corresponding Doléans-Dade exponential:
Lδt := exp
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
1{φ(i)Qr−>−q}
(
log
(
λk,τ (δk,τ,ir )
A
)
dNk,τ,ir −
(
λk,τ (δk,τ,ir )− A
)
dr
),
which is a true martingale by the uniform boundedness of δk,τ,it .8 We can therefore define the Girsanov
change of measure dPδdP0 |Ft = Lδt , for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, all the probability measures Pδ indexed
by δ ∈ A are equivalent. We shall write Eδt for the conditional expectation with respect to Ft under
the probability measure Pδ.
A.3 Well-posedness of the optimization problems
We give in this section the necessary integrability conditions ensuring that both exchange and market
maker’s problems are well defined. We consider the following assumptions:
sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
exp
(
− γ′ξ
)]
< +∞, for some γ′ > γ, sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
exp
(
η′ξ
)]
< +∞, for some η′ > η. (A.1)
Moreover, the next technical assumption is required in order to derive the best response of the market
maker in Theorem 3.4:
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ
[
exp
(
− γ′Y 0,Zt
)]
< +∞, for some γ′ > γ. (A.2)
Finally, we define Z as the set of predictable processes (Zt)t∈[0,T ] such that Conditions (A.1) and (A.2)
are satisfied. This is the set of admissible contract components of the exchange.
A.4 Dynamic programming principle
In the spirit of [4], we provide a proof of a dynamic programming principle for the market maker’s
problem. Note that a same type of dynamic programming principle exists for the exchange’s problem.
For any F stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and µ ∈ Aτ , we define
JT (τ, µ) = Eµτ
[
− exp
(
− γ
(
ξ +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ T
τ
µk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +Qk,τu dCk,τu
))]
where Aτ denotes the restriction of A to controls on [τ, T ]. We also define the set Jτ,T = (JT (τ, µ))µ∈Aτ .
The continuation utility of the market maker is defined for any F -stopping time τ by
8The associated Novikov criterion is given in [12].
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Vτ = ess sup
µ∈Aτ
JT (τ, µ).
We first prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let τ be a stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then there exists an increasing sequence
(µn)n∈N in Aτ such that Vτ = limn→+∞ JT (τ, µn).
Proof. For µ, µ′ ∈ Aτ we define
µˆ := µ1{JT (τ,µ)≥JT (τ,µ′)} + µ′1{JT (τ,µ)≤JT (τ,µ′)}.
We have µˆ ∈ Aτ and by definition of µˆ, JT (τ, µˆ) ≥ max(JT (τ, µ), JT (τ, µ′)). Thus Jτ,T is increasing,
and we obtain the same result as in [4]. The conclusion follows.
We set
Dt,T (δ) := exp
(
− γ
(∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ T
t
δk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +Qk,τu dCk,τu
))
.
Given Lemma A.1, we can now prove the dynamic programming principle associated to (3.6).
Lemma A.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be an F stopping time with values in [t,T]. Then
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
−Dt,τ (δ)Vτ
]
.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be a stopping time with values in [t, T ]. First, by tower property, we have
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
−Dt,T (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]
= ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
Dt,τ (δ)Eδτ
[
−Dτ,T (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]]
.
Then, Bayes rule yields
Eδτ
[
−Dτ,T (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]
= E0τ
[
− L
δ
T
Lδτ
Dτ,T (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]
≤ ess sup
δ∈A
Eδτ
[
Dτ,T (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]
= Vτ .
Finally we obtain
Vt ≤ ess sup
µ∈A
Eµt
[
VτDt,τ (δ)
]
.
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We next prove the reverse inequality. Let δ ∈ A and µ ∈ Aτ . We define (δ ⊗τ µ)u = δu1{0≤u≤τ} +
µu1{τ≤u≤T}. Then δ ⊗τ µ ∈ A and by tower property
Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
−Dτ,T (µ)Dt,τ (δ)exp
(
− γξ
)]
= Eδ⊗τµt
[
Eδ⊗τµτ
[
−Dτ,T (µ)exp(−γξ)
]
Dt,τ (δ)
]
.
Using Bayes formula and noting that L
δ⊗τµ
T
Lδ⊗τµτ
= L
µ
T
Lµτ
, we have
Eδ⊗τµτ
[
−Dτ,T (µ)exp(−γξ)
]
= E0τ
[
− L
µ
T
Lµτ
Dτ,T (µ)exp(−γξ)
]
= JT (τ, µ).
This implies
Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)
]
.
We can therefore use again Bayes rule and the fact that L
δ⊗τµ
τ
Lδ⊗τµt
= Lδτ
Lδt
to obtain
Vt ≥ E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµt
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)
]
= E0t
E0τ
[
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)
]
= E0t
E0τ
[
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
]
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)

= E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)
]
= Eδt
[
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µ)
]
.
Since the previous inequality holds for any µ ∈ Aτ , we deduce from monotone convergence theorem
together with Lemma A.1 that there exists a sequence (µn)n∈N of controls in Aτ such that
Vt ≥ lim
n→+∞E
δ
t
[
Dt,τ (δ)JT (τ, µn)
]
= Eδt
[
Dt,τ (δ) lim
n→+∞JT (τ, µ
n)
]
= Eδt
[
Dt,τ (δ)Vτ
]
.
This concludes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.3
We divide the proof into six steps.
Step 1: Derivation of the martingale representation.
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For δ ∈ A, it follows from the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.2 that the process
U δt = VtD0,t(δ)
defines a Pδ-supermartingale for any δ ∈ A. By standard analysis, we may then consider it in its
càdlàg version (by taking right limits along rationals). By the Doob-Meyer decomposition, we can
write U δt = M δt −Aδt where M δ is a Pδ-martingale and Aδt = Aδ,ct +Aδ,dt is an integrable non-decreasing
predictable process such that Aδ,c0 = Aδ,d0 = 0 with pathwise continuous component Aδ,c and with Aδ,d
a piecewise constant predictable process.
From the martingale representation theorem under Pδ, see Appendix A.1 in [4], there exists Z˜δ =
(Z˜δ,S, Z˜δ,k,τ,i)k∈K,τ∈T ,i=a,b predictable, such that
M δt = V0 +
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,Sr dSr +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,k,τ,ir dN δ,k,τ,ir .
Step 2: Boundedness of the value function.
We show that V is a negative process. In fact, thanks to the uniform boundedness of δ ∈ A, we have
that
LδT
Lδt
≥ αt,T = exp
(
− ∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
k
σ
Nk,τ,iT − 2×#T ×#KAe−
kc∞
σ (e kσ + 1)(T − t)
)
,
where c∞ := max
k,τ
ck,τ . Therefore
Vt ≤ E0t
[
− αt,T exp
(
− γ(δ∞
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Nk,τ,iT +
∫ T
t
Qk,τu dCk,τu )
)
e−γξ
]
< 0.
Step 3: Identification of the coefficients (1/2).
Let Y be the process defined for any t ∈ [0, T ] by Vt = −e−γYt . As Aδ,d is a predictable point process and
the jumps of Nk,τ,i, i = a, b are totally inaccessible stopping times under P0, we have
〈
Nk,τ,i, Aδ,d
〉
t
= 0
a.s. Using Ito’s formula, we obtain that
YT = ξ, and dYt =
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Zk,τ,it dNk,τ,it + ZSt dSt − dIt − dA˜dt ,
24
with
Zk,τ,at = −
1
γ
log
(
1 + Z˜
δ,k,τ,a
t
U δt−
)
− δk,τ,at
Zk,τ,bt = −
1
γ
log
(
1 + Z˜
δ,k,τ,b
t
U δt−
)
− δk,τ,bt
ZSt = −
Z˜δ,St
γU δt−
− ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Qk,τt− ∆
k,τ
It =
∫ t
0
(
h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr − 1
γU δr
dAδ,cr
)
h(δ, Zt, Qt) = h(δ, Zt, Qt)− 12γσ
2(ZSt )2
A˜dt =
1
γ
∑
s≤t
log
(
1− ∆A
δ,d
t
U δt−
)
.
In particular, the last relation between A˜d and Aδ,d shows that ∆at ≥ 0 is independent of δ ∈ A, with
at = −A
δ,d
t
Uδ
t−
and abusing notations slightly, ∆at = −∆A
δ,d
t
Uδ
t−
.
In order to complete the proof, we argue in the subsequent steps that Z ∈ Z and that, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Aδ,dt = −∑s≤t U δs−∆as = 0 so that A˜dt = 0 and It = ∫ t0 H(Zr, Qr)dr, where
H(Zt, Qt) = H(Zt, Qt)− 12γσ
2(ZSt )2.
Step 4: Identification of the coefficients (2/2).
Since VT = −1, we get that
0 = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT ]− V0
= sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT −M δT ]
= γsup
δ∈A
E0
[
LδT
∫ T
0
U δr−(dIr − h(δ, Zr, Qr)dr +
dar
γ
)
]
.
Moreover, the controls being uniformly bounded, we have
U δt ≤ −βt = Vtexp
(
− γ
(
δ∞
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Nk,τ,iT +
∫ t
0
Qk,τu dCk,τu
))
< 0.
Then, using Aδ,d ≥ 0, U δ ≤ 0 and dIt − h(δ, Zt, Qt)dt ≥ 0, we obtain
0 ≤ sup
δ∈A
E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
−βr−
(
dIr − h(δ, Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
= −E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr −H(Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
.
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The quantities α0,T
∫ T
0 βr−(dIr−H(Zr, Qr))dr and α0,T
∫ T
0 βr−
dar
γ
being non-negative random variables,
the result follows.
Step 5: Admissibility of the process Z.
As ξ satisfies the conditions in (A.1), to prove that Z ∈ Z, it is enough to show that for some p > 0
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[exp(−γ(p+ 1)Yt)] < +∞.
Using Hölder inequality together with the boundedness of the intensities of the Nk,τ,i, we have that
sup
δ∈A
Eδ[|U δT |p′+1] < +∞ for some p′ > 0. We deduce
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[|U δt |p
′+1] = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[|U δT |p
′+1] < +∞
because U δ is a Pδ-negative supermartingale. The conclusion follows using again Hölder inequality, the
uniform boundedness of the intensities of the Nk,τ,i and the fact that
exp(−γYt) = U δt exp
(
γ
(∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
δk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +Qk,τu dCk,τu
))
.
Step 6: Uniqueness of the representation.
Let (Y0, Z), (Y
′
0 , Z
′) ∈ R×Z be such that ξ = Y Y0,ZT = Y Y
′
0 ,Z
′
T . By following the lines of the verification
argument in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we obtain the equality Y Y0,Zt = Y
Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t using the fact that the
value of the continuation utility of the market maker satisfies
−e−γY Y0,Zt = −e−γY
Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
− e−γ(PLδT−PLδt+ξ)
]
.
This in turn implies that for t ∈ [0, T ] Zk,τ,it dNk,τ,it = Z
′k,τ,i
t dNk,τ,it and ZSt σ2dt = Z
′S
t σ
2dt = d〈Y, S〉t.
Consequently, (Y0, Z) = (Y
′
0 , Z
′).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Let ξ = Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R×Z. We first prove that for an arbitrary set of controls δ ∈ A, we have
JMM(δ, ξ) ≤ −e−γY0 , where JMM(δ, ξ) is such that VMM(ξ) = sup
δ∈A
JMM(δ, ξ). Then we will see that this
inequality is in fact an equality when the corresponding Hamiltonian h(δ, z, q) is maximized. Denote
Y t := Y Y0,Zt +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
δk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +Qk,τu dCk,τu
with t ∈ [0, T ]. An application of Ito’s formula leads to
de−γY t =γe−γY t−
−( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Qk,τt ∆k,τ + ZSt )dSt + (H(Zt, Qt)− h(δ, Zt, Qt))dt
− ∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
γ−1
(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Zk,τ,it + δk,τ,it
)))
dN δ,k,τ,it
.
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Thus e−γY . is a Pδ-local submartingale. Thanks to Condition (A.2), the uniform boundedness of the
intensities of the Nk,τ,i and Hölder inequality,
(
e−γY t
)
t∈[0,T ]
is uniformly integrable and hence a true
submartingale. Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem gives us that
∫ ·
0
γe−γY t−
− ( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Qk,τt ∆k,τ + ZSt )dSt −
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
γ−1
(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Zk,τ,it + δk,τ,it
)))
dN δ,k,τ,it

is a true martingale. This implies that
JMM(δ, ξ) = Eδ
[
− e−γY T
]
= −e−γY0 − Eδ
[ ∫ T
0
γe−γY t−
(
H(Zt, Qt)− h(δ, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ −e−γY0 .
In addition to this, the previous inequality becomes an equality if and only if δ is chosen as the
maximizer of the Hamiltonian h, thus leading to the optimal quotes provided in Theorem 3.4. So we
deduce JMM(δ, ξ) = −e−γY0 . Finally we have VMM(ξ) = −e−γY0 with optimal response (δˆt)t∈[0,T ].
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Let ξ = Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R×Z. We first prove that for an arbitrary set of controls δ ∈ A, we have
JMM(δ, ξ) ≤ −e−γY0 , where JMM(δ, ξ) is such that VMM(ξ) = sup
δ∈A
JMM(δ, ξ). Then, we will see that this
inequality is in fact an equality when the corresponding Hamiltonian h(δ, z, q) is maximized. Denote
Y t := Y Y0,Zt +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∫ t
0
δk,τ,iu dNk,τ,iu +Qk,τu dCk,τu
with t ∈ [0, T ]. A direct application of Ito’s formula leads to
de−γY t =γe−γY t−
−( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Qk,τt ∆k,τ + ZSt )dSt + (H(Zt, Qt)− h(δ, Zt, Qt))dt
− ∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
γ−1
(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Zk,τ,it + δk,τ,it
)))
dN δ,k,τ,it
.
Thus, e−γY . is a Pδ-local submartingale. Thanks to Condition (A.2), the uniform boundedness of the
intensities of the Nk,τ,i and Hölder inequality,
(
e−γY t
)
t∈[0,T ]
is uniformly integrable and hence is a true
submartingale. Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem gives us that
∫ ·
0
γe−γY t−
− ( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Qk,τt ∆k,τ + ZSt )dSt −
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
γ−1
(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Zk,τ,it + δk,τ,it
)))
dN δ,k,τ,it

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is a true martingale. This implies that
JMM(δ, ξ) = Eδ
[
− e−γY T
]
= −e−γY0 − Eδ
[ ∫ T
0
γe−γY t−
(
H(Zt, Qt)− h(δ, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ −e−γY0 .
In addition to this, the previous inequality becomes an equality if and only if δ is chosen as the
maximizer of the Hamiltonian h thus leading to the optimal quotes provided in Theorem 3.4. So we
deduce JMM(δ, ξ) = −e−γY0 . Finally we have VMM(ξ) = −e−γY0 with optimal response (δˆt)t∈[0,T ].
A.8 Proof of Theorem 3.5
We define for any map v : [0, T ] × Z#K×#T −→ (−∞, 0), x ∈ R, (k, τ) ∈ K × T and (t, q) ∈
[0, T ]× Z#K×#T
v(t, q 	Ki,Tj x) := v(t, qK1,T1 , qK1,T2 , . . . , qKi,Tj+1 , qKi,Tj−x, qKi,Tj+2 , . . . , qKn,Tm).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the stochastic control problem (3.12) is given by
0 = ∂tv(t, q) +HE
(
t, q, v(t, ·)
)
, v(T, q) = −1, (A.3)
with
HE
(
t, q, v(t, ·)
)
= sup
z∈Z
hE
(
t, q, s, z, v(t, ·)
)
,
hE
(
t, q, s, z, v(t, ·)
)
=v(t, q)
(
η
2γσ
2
( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τ (zCk,τ + qk,τ )
)2
+ η
2
2 σ
2
( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τzCk,τ
)2)
+
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
hik,τ
(
t, zk,τ,i, v(t, q), v
(
t, q 	k,τ φ(i)
))
1φ(i)Q>−q
and
hik,τ (t, z, y, y′) =
(
y′xk,τ1 e
az − yx2ebz
)
Ok,τ
where
xk,τ1 = e
−η(ck,τ+ω
(
δk,τ∞ −γ−1 log(1+σγC )
)
, x2 =
(
1 + η
1− (1 + σγ
C
)−1
γ
)
, Ok,τ = (1 +
σγ
C
)−
C
γσ e−
C
σ
fk,τ ,
and
a = η(1− ω) + C
σ
, b = C
σ
.
Tedious but straightforward computations lead to the following optimizers:
z?k,τ,i := 1
a− b log
( bx2v(t, q)
axk,τ1 v
(
t, q 	k,τ φ(i)
)),
z?C
k,τ := − γ
γ + ηq
k,τ .
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Note that from these computations, we get that this above optimization makes sense only if we assume
that there exists δ∞ large enough so that for i = a or b, k ∈ K, τ ∈ T and any t, q:∣∣∣− z?k,τ,it (t, q) + 1γ log
(
1 + σγ
C
)∣∣∣ < δ∞. (A.4)
We will check that we can make such choice at the end of the verification argument. Equation (A.3) is
rewritten as
0 = ∂tv(t, q)+v(t, q)
γη2
γ + η
σ2
2
( ∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
∆k,τqk,τ
)2
−v(t, q)∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
C˜k,τ
(
v(t, q)
v(t, q 	k,τ φ(i))
) C
ση(1−ω)
1φ(i)Q>−q,
(A.5)
where
C˜k,τ =x2(
x2
xk,τ1
)
a
a−bOk,τ
(
( b
a
)
b
a−b − ( b
a
)
a
a−b
)
> 0.
We now make the ansatz v(t, q) = u(t,Q). We derive the following PDE
0 = ∂tu(t,Q) + u(t,Q) γη
2
γ + η
σ2
2 Q
2 − u(t,Q)∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
C˜k,τ
(
u(t,Q)
u(t,Q−∆k,τφ(i))
) C
ση(1−ω)
1φ(i)Q>−q,
(A.6)
with terminal condition u(T,Q) = −1.
Using the classical change of variable u˜ := (−u)− Cση(1−ω) , PDE (A.6) becomes
0 = ∂tu˜(t,Q)− u˜(t,Q) Cγη
γ + η
σ
2(1− ω)Q
2 +
∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
Cˆk,τ u˜(t,Q−∆k,τφ(i))1φ(i)Q>−q, (A.7)
where Cˆk,τ := C˜k,τ C
ση(1−ω) . Eventually Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem provides existence and uniqueness of
a bounded solution to (A.7) and so to (A.5).
For the verification argument, we first introduce a technical lemma.
Lemma A.3. Let Z ∈ Z, ξ = Y Yˆ0,ZT . We define
KZt := exp
(
− η
(∑
i=a,b
∑
(k,τ)∈K×T
ck,τNk,τ,it −
∫ t
0
ω
(
∆i(Zk,τ,is )− δk,τ∞
)
dNk,τ,is − Y Y0,Zt
))
, t ∈ [0, T ].
There exists  > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδˆ(Z)
[
|KZt |1+
]
< +∞,
where δˆ(Z) is defined in Theorem 3.4.
29
The proof is borrowed from [4]. We now verify that the unique solution v of Equation (A.3) coincides
at any point (0, Q0) with the value vE0 of the reduced problem (3.12). We also prove that in (3.12), the
maximum is achieved for feedback controls issued from (3.13).
Using Itô’s formula we get
d[v(t, Qt)KZt ] = KZt−
[(
hE
(
t, Qt− , St, Zt, v(t, ·)
)
−HE
(
t, Qt− , v(t, ·)
))
dt
+ v(t, Qt−)η
K∑
k=1
T∑
τ=1
ZC
k,τ
t dC
k,τ
t
+
∑
i=a,b
K∑
k=1
T∑
τ=1
(
e−η(c
k,τ−Zk,τ,it )v(t, Qk,τt− − φ(i))− v(t, Qt−)
)
dN δˆ(Z),k,τ,it
]
.
The process KZ is uniformly integrable on [0, T ] according to (A.2), Hölder inequality and the bound-
edness of the intensity of the processes Nk,τ,i. Moreover v being uniformly bounded as a consequence of
the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, the process
(
v(t, Qt)KZt
)
t∈[0,T ] is a P
δˆ(Z) supermartingale and the local
martingale term in the above equation is a true martingale. Hence
v(0, Q0) ≥ Eδˆ(Z)[v(T,QT )KZT ] = −Eδˆ(Z)[KZT ]. (A.8)
Since Z ∈ Z is arbitrary, we get
v(0, Q0) ≥ sup
Z∈Z
− Eδˆ(Z)[KZT ] = vE0 .
The feedback form of Z, issued from (3.13), being bounded according to Equation (A.4), it is admissi-
ble. Considering the process Z?, we get an equality instead of an inequality in the above equation.
For consistency we now check that there does exist some constant δ∞ such that (A.4) is satisfied. In
the same vein as in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.4, we can show that for any t and q, v(t, q) is
negative. Because of the compactness of the domain of v, the function is uniformly negative: we can
find ε such that v < −ε on [0, T ] × D. Consequently log
(
v(t,q)
v
(
t,qk,τ	k,τφ(i)
)) is uniformly bounded in
i, k, τ, t and q. Thus we can always choose a δ∞ satisfying (A.4).
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